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THE EFFECT OF INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES ON FDI INFLOWS:  
EVIDENCE FROM UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
 
Bülent Doğru1 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 For two decades, the relationship between institutions and foreign direct investment (FDI) has  been 
receiving a growing attention as a result of increasing economic globalization and international trade promoting 
democracy all over the world. In this paper, we investigate the impact of institutional variables, social, economic 
and political, on foreign direct investment inflows into 54 upper-middle income developing countries applying 
panel data regressions for the period 1995-2011. The findings suggest that the institutional variables have 
significant effect on FDI inflows but their impact is weaker than macoreconomic variables. Especially, the market 
size indicators, population growth rate, global competitiveness and international country risk play a major role in 
attracting FDI. 
 
Keywords: Institutional Variables, Foreign Direct Investment, Upper-Middle Income Countries, Panel Data 
Regression. 
 
JEL Classification: F21, C23, F55 
 
ÖZET 
 
 Geçen yirmi yılda uluslar arası ticaretin tüm dünyada demokrasiyi teşvik eder hale gelmesi ve artan 
ekonomik globalizasyonun sonucu olarak, kurumlar ve doğrudan yabancı yatırımlar  (DYY) arasındaki ilişki, 
giderek artan bir ilgi görmüştür. Bu çalışmada, sosyo ekonomik ve politik kurumsal değişkenlerin doğrudan 
yabancı yatırımlara olan etkisini 54 üst-orta gelir grubundaki gelişmekte olan ülke için panel data regresyon 
tekniğini kullanarak 1995-2011 dönemi için analiz etmekteyiz. Ampirik bulgulara göre kurumsal değişkenler 
DYY üzerine anlamlı etkiye sahiptirler ancak makroekonomik değişkenlerin  DYY üzerine etkisi kurumsal 
değişkenlerden daha güçlüdür. Özellikle, piyasa hacmi göstergesi olan değişkenler, nüfusun artış hızı, global 
rekabet edebilirlik ve uluslar arası ülke riski değişkenleri DYY çekmede  önemli rol oynamaktadır. 
  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kurumsal Değişkenler, Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımlar, Üst-Orta Gelir Grubu Ülkeleri, Panel 
Data Regresyon. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the early nineties, there is a growing consensus among economist and political 
scientist that institution variables, the social, economic, legal, and political organization of a 
society, are crucial determinants of economic development and growth (Acemoglu 
andJohnson, 2005). According to a large literature, good institutions can encourage foreign 
invesments, improve efficiency of domestic economic activities and significantly contribute to 
the economic growth in short run and economic development in long run (Daniele andMarani, 
2006).  
 The main reason of focusing on quality of institutions as determinants of FDI, 
especially in developing countries, is the rose in FDI inflows in past two decades. Global FDI 
inflows rose in 2010 to $1.24 trillion, following the large declines of 2008 and 2009.  The 
share of developing and transition economies in global FDI inflows is more than fifty percent 
and has continued to rise (UNCTAD, 2011). As a result of this rose, FDI inflows has played a 
crucial role in promoting economic growth and development of all income groups of 
developing countries. FDI also increases the volume of investment and job creation in host 
countries (LI, 2005: 393), and enhances job creation, managerial skills and transfer of 
technology (Wafure andNurudeen, 2010: 26; Borenszteina, et.al., 1998). 
 
 Recently there are many studies searching impact of institutions on FDI (Bénassy-
Quéré, et.al., 2007; Bevan, et.al., 2004; Xu andShenkar, 2002; Knack and Keefer, 1995; 
Clarke, 2001; Daniele and Marani, 2006; Kostevc et al., 2007). Most of these studies suggest 
that lack of political and economic stability, i.e., third-class institutions discourage foreign 
investors from more FDI into the host country. These countries are supposed to make reforms 
in legal structure, trade and tariffs  to establish a convenient condition for foreign investors. 
Because these investors demand quality domestic instutions and infrastructure to invest their 
bussines operations abroad. In developed countries citizens have political and civil liberties, 
and have good institutions. But poor countires are deprived of most of these quality of 
domestic institutions required for their development (Coyne and Sobel, 2010; Acemoglu 
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andJohnson, 2005; Janine, 2000; Barro, 1996). Besides positively relationship between 
economic growth and institutional quality, many studies have recently show that there are also 
significant impacts of good institutions on Foreign Direct Inflows (FDI).  
 
 In this paper we investigate the effect of good institutional variables on foreign direct 
investment inflows into 54 upper-middle income countries from different regions over the 
world.2 The main reason why upper-middle income countries is selected for this study is that 
these countries are both developing countries and also less studies have been done on them as 
an income group. Panel time series techniques is used to estimate model established for the 
period 1995-2011. The findings suggest that the quality of institutions have overall a positive 
and significant effect on FDI inflows. According to econometric findings, FDI is positively 
related to the  global competitiveness which includes judicial independence, impartial courts, 
protection of property rights, quality of bureaucracy, administrative requirements and 
international country risk (ICR) which includes military interference in rule of law and the 
integrity of the legal system, and is negatively related doing bussines (DB) which includes 
legal enforcement of contracts, regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property, 
bureaucracy costs, labor market regulations and starting a business. In other words, the 
increase in perception of the quality of institutions affects FDI inflows positively. 
 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follow: First we give a theoric backround about 
FDI inflows and institutional variables in section 2. Section 3 and 4 introduces the model, 
data and the methodolog used for the analysis. Panel regression estimation result is presented 
in section 5 followed by a conclusion and policy recommendations in last section. 
 
2. FDI INFLOWS AND INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES 
 
 Institutions are informal (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions) and formal 
(constitutions, laws, property rights) constraints that facillitate political, economic and social 
outcomes (North, 1991: 97; 1990). The presence of good institutions reduce uncertainity and 
                                                 
2 List of country concerned is given at Appendix Table A1 
4 
 
cost of business doing through their influence on production and transaction costs (Coyne and 
Sobel, 2010: 164), and tends to improve factory productivity by stimulating investments. 
Additionaly, since FDI involves high sunk costs, social and political instabiliy, insecurity 
environment, enforcement of property rights and effectiveness of the legal system have 
negative impact on FDI inflows (Daniele and Marani, 2006: 7).  
 
 According to The New Institutionalist Approach, together with the standart 
constraints of macroeconomics, a countriy’s institutional framework is the most important 
factor determininig its economic performance, and quality of domestic institutions is a key 
explanation of cross-country differences in growth rates and GDP per capita. Because 
effective institutions reduces transaction and production costs so much that potential gains 
from foreigner investments are realizable. In fact, the debate on adverse effects of less 
qualified institutions on FDI inflows mostly has been analyzed in context of cost of doing 
business in host country. Less developed or less qualified legal system and institutitons result 
in unclear regulatory frameworks, cumbersome bureaucracy, legal barriers and corruption 
which deter more FDI inflows into host country (Dumludağ, 2006: 8). Therefore, prevailing 
explicit and implicit behavioral norms are rules of a game in a society having capacity to 
create appropriate incentives for desirable economic behavior (Rodrik and Subramania, 
2003). .   
 
 Studies investigating role of institutions attracting FDI show that effective 
enforcement of civil and property rights, economic freedom and  a regulatory system can 
stimulate both domestic and foreign private investments. In other side, less qualified 
institutions means a risky enviroenment for investors. There are several indicators can be used 
to show political, economic and social risky level of a country. Among these indicators,  the most 
widely used risk indicators are the two ones worked out by the Political Risk Service Group’s 
(PRS) indexes and Fraser Institute’s World Economic Freedom ratings. For upper-middle income 
developing countries, the relationship between the average institutional ratings and FDI inflow (% 
of GDP) is depicted in figure 1. A positive and significant correlation between the risky level of a 
country, represented by institutions, and FDI inflows is clearly seen from the figure.  
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Figure 1. FDI Inflows (% of GDP) and Average Institutional Rating of  
Upper-Middle Income Developing Countries 
 Source: Fraser Institute’s World Economic Freedom and PRS 
 
 Foreign direct investment has a major role in economic development of emerging and 
developing countries for three reasons: Lack of capital to finance domestic economic 
activities, lack of technology and know-how to run the the domestic projects. For these three 
reasons, both advanced and developing countries are competing with each other on attracting 
more FDI (Masron andAbdullah, 2010). Although FDI was accelerated with the economic 
liberalization in 1990s, total world FDI inflows has been growing tremendously after 2000s. 
Total FDI inflows has increased from only US$ 54 billion in 1985 to US$ 1,770 billion in 
2007 before it started to fall between 2007 and 2009 (UNCTAD, 2010). FDI inflows into 
middle-income developing countries, as depicted in Figure 2, seem to be less decreased as 
compared to those flows into high-income developing countries after global financial crisis of 
2008.  
 
 Most of recent work have also proved that there is a strong relationship between GDP 
growth rate and FDI inflows of developing countries. Figure 2 shows average foreign direct 
investment (% GDP) and average GDP growth rate (%) of upper-middle income countries 
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between 2000 and 2010. The positive correlation between GDP growth rate and FDI is clearly 
seen until 2007. In Figure 3, GDP growth rate seems to be more reduced as compared to FDI 
inflows. According to UNCTAD (2010),  inflows of FDI per GDP (%) into the upper-middle 
income countries decreased by 17,7 %  in 2009 an 6,08 %  over the previous year (Table 1), 
while in the same period the total world FDI inflows decreased by 15,5 %  in 2008 and 37,3 
% in 2009. 
 
 
Figure 2. FDI and GDP Growth Rate of Upper-Middle Income Countries 
Source: UNCTAD (2010) and Worldbank 
 
 The causal relationship between institutions and GDP  growth rate has been examined 
by some authors. The the causality from good institutions to GDP growth rate is provided by 
many studies like Kaufmann and Kray (2008) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004) 
support that institutions can stimulate economic growth. However , these studies  do not find 
evidence for reverse causality. Some economists like Rodrik and Subramanian (2003) 
theoretically demonstrate that there could be a bi-directional causality running between GDP 
growth rate and institutions. They suggest that domestic production rate needs good 
institutions, whereas good institutions will result in higher income growth. But bi-directional 
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causality between income growth and institutions is still a matter of debate among economists 
(Masron and Abdullah, 2010: 6-7). 
 
 
Figure 3. Foreign Direct Investment Inflows of Economic Groupings (Million USD) 
   Source: UNCTAD 
Table 1. Foreign Direct Investment Inflows Into Upper-Middle Income Countries 
Year Average foreign direct investment (% of GDP) % change 
2003 5,41 30,50 
2004 5,35 -1,07 
2005 5,29 -1,01 
2006 6,85 29,47 
2007 7,56 10,24 
2008 7,13 -5,67 
2009 5,86 -17,77 
2010 5,50 -6,08 
 Source: Worldbank 
 
 According to Fraser Institute, there are five different areas and their sub-components 
determining economic political and economic stability of a country. Area 1: Size of 
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government, Area 2: Legal structure and security of property rights, Area 3: Access to sound 
Money, Area 4: Freedom to trade internationally, Area 5: Regulation of credit, labour and 
business. However, in this study we focus only on impact of Area 2 and Area 5 and their 
severeal sub-components, i.e., judicial independence (GC), impartial courts (GC), protection 
of property rights (GC), military interference in rule of law and the political process (ICR), 
integrity of the legal system (ICR), legal enforcement of contracts (DB), regulatory 
restrictions on the sale of real property (DB), bureaucracy costs (GC), administrative 
requirements (GC), hours regulations (labor market regulations) (DB), starting a business 
(DB), and credit market regulations on FDI inflows into host country. As it is easily can be 
seen, area 2 guarantees protection of persons and their property rights in host country, while 
area 5 is related to constrains of doing business in credit, labor and manufacture markets. 
These two areas and their sub-components together are determinants of institutional variables 
of our study. But from these two areas and their sub-components we construct  DB, ICR and 
GC as institutional variables indicators with the average weighting technique recommended 
by Fraser Institute (Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall, 2011: 7-8).  
 
3. LITERATURE VIEW 
 
 In the literature there are several empirical studies using institutional variables as the 
non-economic factors of FDI determinants. The empirical studies vary in terms of variables, 
income level groups and regions. Especially, past two decades many scholars have studied the 
effect of instutional and macroeconomic variables on foreign direct investment inflows. The 
common idea figured out from these studies is that institutional variables are significantly 
important determinants of FDI and good institutions almost always increase the amount of 
FDI received by host country (Bénassy-Quéré, et.al., 2007: 4). In other words, lack of 
political and economic stability, unclear regulatory environment and underdeveloped legal 
system deter more FDI inflows into host countries. 
 
 Bénassy-Quéré et. al. (2005) have investigated the implication of institution on FDI 
inflow by controlling for GDP per capita with different econometric techniques. According to 
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their findings, good institutions and  public efficiency level of a country which includes tax 
systems, ease to create a company, lack of corruption, transparency, integrity of legal system, 
protection of property rights and judicial independence are major and significant determinants 
of inward FDI in a broad sense. Kostevc et al. (2007) also attempt to examine the hypothesis 
of “good institutions lead more FDI inflows” as Benassy-Querre et. al. for transisiton 
economies. The results support recent studies: Institutional quality has significantly influence 
on the level of FDI in those economies.    
 In the work searching relationship between political, social and economic institutions 
and foreign direct investment flows by applying panel data regressions including 67 
developing countries for the period 1984-2005,  Dumludağ (2006) has found that better 
perceptions of the quality of institutions have overall a positive and economically significant 
effect on FDI. He also stresses that the underdeveloped legal system, politic and economic 
instabilities and high level of corruption are major reason to deter FDI. 
 Daniele and Marani (2006) also use the hypothesis based on the significant role of the 
quality of institutions to attract FDI using the Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005) 
governance indicators for MENA countries. They find that institutions have strong effect in 
attracting FDI, suggesting that MENA countries need deep institutional reforms both in legal 
system and doing bussines methods to improve the attractiveness of these countries in terms 
of FDI. 
 The study of Globerman and Shapiro (2002) investigates the connection between 
indicator variables of  national institutional systems and FDI in 144 countries. The work is 
concluded that FDI is mostly affected by the political governance.  
 Busse and Groizard (2008) produce a regulation index for only top 20 or 30 percent 
regulated countries using data provided by doing business, starting a business, labor market 
regulations, contract regulations, creditor rights and insolvency regulations mostly correlated 
with FDI inflows are used for index and then are transformed into an overall index of 
regulations. Busse and Groizard come to conclusion that countries applying high regulation 
standards are generally less successful to attract more FDI inflows. For that reason, they 
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emphasize that government, in the first place, has to develop the quality of regulations in 
home country to benefit from more foreign capital. 
 
4. THE MODEL AND THE DATA 
 
 In this study, we employ a panel regression to ases the effect of institutions on FDI for 
54  upper-middle income developing countries. We regress FDI inflows per GDP for the 
period 1995-2011 on a set of macroeconomic and institutional independent variables. There 
are many advantages of using panel data for such a work. Firstly, the sample size in panel 
data is much larger than would be the case if we run with pure time-series or cross-sectional 
datas. Secondly, panel data is a beter detection method compared to pure cross-section and 
pure time-series data to identify and measure effects that are simply not detectable. Panel data 
also give more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more 
degrees of freedom and more efficiency. Time-series studies are plagued with 
multicollinearity (Baltagi, 2005: 5-7). However, considering that the institutional variables are 
highly correlated with each other we will also put each one of them individually  in diffrent 
panel regression equations in which the macroeconomic variables, GDP growth rate, inflation, 
GDP per capita, openness, population growth rate, urban population and school enrollment 
are held constant. Therefore, our benchmark FDI equation estimated may be built up in the 
following linear form: 
 
                                                              
                                              
                           
 
 Where i is the country and t is the time subscript, βs are unknown coeficients of 
elastcities to be estimated,   is the random disturbance term and   is the unobserved 
country specific effects. Ln represents the natural logarithm of variables. All explanatory 
variables are lagged one year to take into account that the decision of investment abroad of 
foreign investors take time (Sadıq, 2009). The dependent variable is natural logarithm of FDI 
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per GDP recevied at time t. The key independent variables, i.e., instituonal variables in host 
country  are measured by "Fraser Institute Economic Freedom of the World 2011 Annual 
Report".  The macroeconomic control variables of the model comes from  World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. The definition, source and expected signs of dependent and 
independent varibles are presented in Table 2, summary statistics and correlation matrix of 
data are shown in Table 3 and 4 respectively. As seen from table 3, we expect FDI to be 
positively and significantly related to the macroeconomic and institutional variables of the 
host country’s GDP growth, GDP per capita, urban population growth rate, total population 
growth rate, openness of the economy to foreign trade and infrastructural development, school 
enrollment in host country. However, FDI is expected to be negatively related to economic 
instability, i.e inflation, country risk, global competitiveness and doing bussines. We also 
expect that institutional variables have played a significant role in determining the location of 
FDI inflows. 
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Table 2. Definitions, sources  and expected signs of variables 
Variable  Description Source  Expected sign 
LOGFDI Natural logarithm of foreign direct investment per GDP  Worldbank  
       Annual percentage growth rate of real GDP measures the host country’s market size. Worldbank + 
GDPPGRW Annual percentage growth rate of gross domestic product per capita measures host country’s market size too. Worldbank + 
      Annual change in consumer price index.  Economic  stability is controlled by the inflation rate in host countries.  Worldbank - 
        The sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP.  It indicates the opennes of host country’s economy to foreign 
trade and infrastructural investments.  
Worldbank + 
       The growth rate of total population. A very fast growing population of a country may serve as catalyst for FDI inflows.  Worldbank + 
    Percentage of secondary scholl enrollment in gross. This control variable is used to indicate the quality of human 
capital by the host country.  
Worldbank + 
       The growth rate of urban population as a proxy for urbanization. Foreign investors take this signal for potential 
investment environment. 
Worldbank + 
    Indicator of country risk level, and includes military interference in rule of law and the political process and integrity of  
the legal system 
Fraser 
Institute 
+ 
   Indicator of doing bussines in host country, and  includes legal enforcement of contracts, regulatory restrictions on the 
sale of real property, hours regulations and starting a business.  
Fraser 
Institute 
- 
   Indicator of Global Competitiveness, and includes judicial independence, impartial courts, bureaucracy costs, 
administrative requirements and protection of property right 
Fraser 
Institute 
+ 
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Table 3.  Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 From table 3 it is seen that standart deviation of OPENNES, URBPOP, INF and SCH 
series are very high in which means that volatility of these variables differ a wide range in our 
sample, and as expected FDI is positively but unexpectedly weak corelated with 
macroeconomic varables of host country.   
Sample: 54 Host Countries (1995-2011) 
 Variables   Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Observations 
LOGFDI  20,55424  25,68651  16,65552  1,857266  351 
GDPGRW(-1)  4,501316  26,40000 -17,955  4,889108  351 
GDPPGRW(-1)  3,625246  25,11293 -17,545  4,927174  351 
INF(-1)  8,071324  79,53457 -18,848  9,308333  351 
OPENNES(-1)  11,73009  67,32718 -33,271  16,63387  351 
POPGRW(-1)  0,852979  4,120941 -1,861  0,883716  351 
SCH(-1)  106,9995  148,5003  82,52008  9,346282  351 
URBPOP(-1)  61,14701  92,98000  27,60000  17,76009  351 
DB(-1) 5,57 9,80 2,23 1,23 351 
GC(-1) 3,71 8,56 2,12 1,98 351 
ICR(-1) 4,41 9,12 2,34 1,12 351 
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Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
 
LOGFDI INF(-1) GDPPGRW(-1) GDPGRW(-1) POPGRW(-1) OPENNES(-1) SCH(-1) URBPOP(-1) DB(-1) GC(-1) ICR(-1) 
LOGFDI 1,00 
          
INF(-1) 0,10 1,00 
         
GDPPGRW(-1) 0,18 0,06 1,00 
        
GDPGRW(-1) 0,20 0,05 0,98 1,00 
       
POPGRW 0,08 -0,03 -0,17 0,01 1,00 
      
OPENNES(-1) 0,21 0,18 0,69 0,68 -0,09 1,00 
     
SCH 0,08 0,04 -0,07 0,00 0,36 0,01 1,00 
    
URBPOP(-1) 0,35 0,21 0,06 0,05 -0,01 0,15 0,23 1,00 
   
DB(-1) -0,04 -0,01 -0,05 -0,05 0,00 -0,10 0,02 -0,01 1,00 
  
GC(-1) -0,11 0,07 -0,10 -0,11 -0,01 -0,09 -0,02 -0,04 -0,17 1,00 
 
ICR(-1) 0,00 -0,07 0,16 0,16 -0,01 0,10 -0,03 0,01 0,01 -0,44 1,00 
Notes: Correlation matrix shows relation between logaritm value of FDI per GDP in t time and the other economic and non-economic  
variables in t-1 time.  Macroeconomic variables are taken from Worldbank and non-economic variables comes from Fraser Institutte’s reports. 
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 Table 4 shows that there are not high correlations between the institutional variables 
except GC and ICR. The correlation between GDPGRW and GDPPGRW is as expected both 
positive and high. Also, correlations between OPENNES and GDPGRW and OPPENNES and 
GDPPGRW are positive and high too.  
 Before estimation, we have performed Im, Pesaran, and Shin (IPS) and Fischer-
Augmented Dickey Fuller (Fischer-ADF) unit root tests to decide stationarity level of the 
series since the variables may incorporate unit roots. The null hypotesis in ADF –Fischer and 
IPS unit root tests is that all series have unit root, against the alternative hypothesis claiming 
that some series are stationary. The result of unit root tests is shown in table 5.  
 
Table 5. Panel Unit Root Tests For Series 
Test Statistic 
(Null hypothesis: Series has unit root, i.e., nonstationary) 
 
IPS
a 
Fisher-ADF
b 
Results 
Variables level 1st difference level 1 st difference 
 LOGFDI -0,354 -10,455* 79,243 181,234* Stationary at 1
st
 dif. 
GDPGRW(-1) 
 
-6,675* - 206,856* - Stationary at level 
GDPPGRW(-
1) 
-6,508* - 203,678* - Stationary at level 
INF(-1)   -10,66* - 385,677* - Stationary at level 
OPENNES(-1) -6,678* - 227,453* - Stationary at level 
POPGRW(-1) -14,57 - 335,678* - Stationary at level 
SCH(-1) 1,456 -6,656* 71,435 157,012* Stationary at 1
st
 dif. 
      (-1) -14,45* - 324,567** - Stationary at level 
ICR(-1) 1,567 -6,879* 28,567 204,566* Stationary at 1
st
 dif. 
DB(-1) -0,879 -10,567* 72,345 155,678* Stationary at 1
st
 dif. 
       -1,234 -6,688* 80,456 189,786* Stationary at 1
st
 dif. 
Notes: a and b: Test statistics are the Im, Pesaran, and Shin W-statistic (IPS) and the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
Chi-square (ADF). Lag-length is selected by AIC. * and  ** denotes statistical significance at a 1% and 5% 
respectively.  
 
 The test statistics of unit root tests reveal that the LOGFDI,   , ICR, DB and SCH are 
stationary at first difference, however GDPPGRW, INF, OPENNES, POPGRW and        
are stationary at level. To avoid spurious regression, Kao panel cointegration test is applied to 
investigate the cointegation between variables in long-term. The null hypothesis saying there is 
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no cointegration is rejected, i.e in long –term variables can be regressed in the same model 
without taking difference.  
 We should decide the estimation method before running the regression equations. As 
we do not know whether the random effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables or 
not, we employ a Hausman (1978) test to compare the fixed and random effects estimates of 
coefficients (Eviews, 2006). As it is seen from appendix Table A2, we rejected the null 
hypothesis of Hausman test saying there is random effects, that is, we should use fixed effects 
model for estimation. The analysis employs an unbalanced panel data for 54 countries over 
the period 1995–2011.  
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 Table 6 presents the estimation results of equation (1), includes only macroeconomic 
variables and  equation (2), includes both macroeconomic and institutional variables with 
Panel Fixed effects. Equaiton (3), (4) and (5), indicate the estimation results when each of 
institutional variables is  taken into consideration one by one. We add institutional variables 
one by one to avoid multicollinearity between institutional variables. In equation 1, the 
coefficients of macroeconomic variables have the expected signs. Population growth rate, 
school enrollment percentage and the market size indiactors, real growth and GDP per capita, 
were found to be both significant and positive in attracting FDI into upper-middle income 
countries. If the gross domestic product growth rate and GDP per capita growth rate increase 
1%, FDI inflows into host country will rise by 2,63 and 2,67 % respectively. This is consistent 
with studies of Wafure and Nurudeen (2010), Koyuncu (2010) and Obwona (1997).  This 
estimation result suggests that larger market size have a better attracting performance on FDI 
into host country.  
 However, urban population growth rate and trade opennes level of the economy to the 
world is positively related to FDI but are insignificant. The coefficient of the inflation, 
economic stability indicator of the country was found negative but insignificant. Significance 
of these market based indicators encourage foreign investors to establish their bussines 
operations abroad.  
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 Column 2 of the table 6, equation 2,  includes all institutional and macroeconomic 
variables. Global competitiveness and international country risky  both are positively and 
significantly related to the FDI inflows at the 5 and 10 percent level respectively, however 
although the sign of coefficient of doing bussines is negative as expected, the impact of doing 
bussines on FDI is insignificant.  
 In the following equations 3, 4 and 5 when we ad institutional variables one by one to 
measure their pure impact on FDI, wee see that the signs of all variables are as expected but 
there is problems with significance levels. Only in eq2 doing bussines and in eq 4 global 
competitiveness are significant. Country risk in eq 5 is insignificant. 
 These results confirm that judicial independence (GC), impartial courts (GC), 
protection of property rights (GC), military interference in rule of law and the political 
process (ICR), integrity of the legal system (ICR), a good quality of bureaucracy(GC), 
administrative requirements (GC) and credit market regulations on FDI inflows into host 
country are of first priority of the foreign investors’decision to invest abroad. In other 
saying,  the increase in perception of the quality of institutions affects FDI inflows positively. 
Although our findings correspond to other studies on FDI and instutional variables (Bénassy-
Quéré, et.al, 2007; Bevan, et.al, 2004; Altomonte, 2000; Asiedu, 2006), Kayam (2006) has 
found that among the institutional variables, bureaucracy quality, investment risk and 
government stability have no significant impact on FDI inflows (Kayam, 2006: 15). 
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Table 6. Determinants of FDI Inflows, The Role of Macroeconomic And Institutional 
Variables for 54 Upper-Middle Income Developing Countries Between 1995 and 2011.  
 
  eq1  eq2 eq3 eq4 eq5 
CONSTANT 92.16445 5.629387 -2.294480 1.476243 -27.51177 
 
(3.316578)* (2.010912)** (-0.645725) (0.514485) (-1.745515)*** 
GDPGRW(-1) 2.637460 0.626863 2.128049 2.139469 
 
 
(2.915907)* (-0.588815) (-1.884723)** (-1.921864)** 
 GDPPGRW(-1) 2.671755 0.641622 2.146855 2.169147 12.895887 
 
(2.931876)* (0.598467) (1.889260)** (1.936033)** (2.398876)* 
INF(-1) -0.001933 -0.001934 -0.005682 -0.012005 -0.012541 
 
(-0.383204) (1.83539)*** (0.911082) (1.908736)** (-0.406800) 
POPGRW(-1) 2.633166 0.801094 2.095772 2.149741 12.17062 
 
(2.865895)* (0.738425) (1.827122)*** (1.898150)** (2.224567)** 
OPENNES(-1) 0.002109 0.008136 0.000226 0.008426 0.037208 
 
(0.505527) (2.243026)** (-0.043833) (2.227627)* (1.826537)*** 
URBPOP(-1) 0.054222 0.249035 0.564278 0.031400 0.455992 
 
(1.192667) (7.147547)* (0.5730) (-0.876743) (2.300923)** 
SCH(-1) 0.018948 0.002073 0.006335 0.004065 0.053454 
 
(1.856260)*** (-0.170201) (0.514328) (0.328263) (0.783267) 
DB(-1) 
 
-0.014602 -0.036077 
  
  
(-0.590539) (-1.82569)*** 
  GC(-1) 
 
0.048131 
 
0.032966 
 
  
(2.415405)** 
 
(1.83925)*** 
 ICR(-1) 
 
0.019490 
  
0.088358 
  
(1.833067)*** 
  
(0.748898) 
R-square 0.234 0.236 0.235 0,189 0,289 
Adjusted R-squared 0.124 0.08 0,156 0,137 0,213 
F-statistic 4.324 1.236 1.325 36.098 7,654 
Prob(F-statistic) 0,000 0,000 0,065 0,023 0,000 
Hausman statistic 51.345 41.745 43.544 39.749 55.347 
model type FE FE FE FE FE 
No. Obs. 351 351 336 336 407 
-***, ** and *** shows 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively, t- statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
In conclusion, an important result we have figured out from empirical analysis is that 
macroeconomic variables have a strong impact on FDI inflows rather than the institutional 
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variables. Additionaly, institutional variables have expected signs in regression equations but 
their effect on FDI inflows is weak and significiance level is problematic in some equaitons. 
 
 CONCLUSION  
 This paper analyses the impact of institutional variables on foreign direct investments 
in the upper-middle income developing countries. The main hypothesis is based on the 
significant role of the good institutions to attract FDI. The panel least square method is 
employed to estimate the relationship between FDI and  its potential macroeconomic and 
instutional determinants using a sample of 54 developing countries for the period of 1995-
2011. 
 The panel regression results show that the size of economic activity (GDP growth rate 
and GDP per capita growth rate), population growth rate and school enrollment are the 
principal determinants of FDI inflows to host country,  however economic stability, indicated 
by inflation rate,  is not a major determinant of FDI. Among institutional variables country 
risk and global competitiveness are positively related to FDI   as expected and have 
significant coefficients.  
 Empirical findings also suggest that although institutional variables are significant and 
have expected signs, their impact on FDI inflows are rather weaker than macroeconomic 
variables. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A1. List Of Countries In The Study 
Albania Ecuador Namibia 
Algeria Gabon Palau 
American Samoa Grenada Panama 
Antigua and Barbuda Iran, Islamic Rep. Peru 
Argentina Jamaica Romania 
Azerbaijan Jordan Russian Federation 
Belarus Kazakhstan Serbia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Latvia Seychelles 
Botswana Lebanon South Africa 
Brazil Libya St. Kitts and Nevis 
Bulgaria Lithuania St. Lucia 
Chile Macedonia, FYR St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
China Malaysia Suriname 
Colombia Maldives Thailand 
Costa Rica Mauritius Tunisia 
Cuba Mayotte Turkey 
Dominica Mexico Uruguay 
Dominican Republic Montenegro Venezuela, RB 
 
 
 
Table A2. Hausman Test 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
 Test cross-section random effects 
  Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Period random 41.055148 8 0.0000 
 
 
 
